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Changing Patterns of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa:

Analysis of UCDP/PRIO Dataset from the 1960s to the 2000s

OKANO, Hideyuki*

Abstract

This article elucidates trends of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa (thereafter 'Africa') from the 1960s to the 2000s. For this purpose, this article uses the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The UCDP/PRIO dataset provides a numerical definition of 'armed conflict.' This definition enables an objective selection of cases. From the cases selected from the UCDP/PRIO, I uncover trends of the civil wars in Africa. First, majority of civil wars in the 1990s were newly broken. Among countries that experienced civil wars in the decade, more than half countries had not been involved in civil war before (if they were, not intense), while the rest of the countries faced with continuations of armed conflicts from the 1960s. This tells that the 1990s are the decade in which more new armed conflicts broke out than other decades. Second, the civil wars in the 1990s have a precursor. Coups erupted in several countries in the 1980s. Most of the countries that experienced the coups were not involved in civil wars in the following decade. The probable reason is that the coups provided an opportunity for national reforms, while countries that experienced civil wars in the 1990s missed the chances. Third, the larger part of new civil wars in the 1990s broke out not only because of domestic factors, but also because of influ-

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* Senior Researcher, Kinugasa Research Organization, Ritsumeikan University

ence from neighboring countries. Several zones were observable, in which armed conflicts of respective countries affected each other.

Keywords:

civil war, sub Saharan Africa, UCDP/PRIO

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to capture the long-term trends of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa from the 1960s to the 2000s¹⁾(Theafter, I use Africa and sub-Saharan Africa interchangeably). The examined period starts from 1960 because the majority of countries in Africa achieved independence from 1960 on. In Africa, civil wars pauselessly persist somewhere since 1960. This article analyzes the trends of African civil wars until 2009.

Majority of studies on civil wars in Africa have focused on the 1990s. The civil wars in this decade were perceived to be unprecedented in scale as well as in number. Several countries lost their central governments because of civil wars such as Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. The impact of the 1990s was so strong that the majority of studies on the African civil wars have solely examined the 1990s (cf. Allen 1999; Kaldor 1999; Takeuchi 2007; Zartman 1995).

A recent study tells that the trend from the 1990s transformed since the mid-2000s. According to Strauss, new patterns of civil wars have emerged in Africa since the late 2000s (Straus 2012). Since the trend of the 1990s has begun to change, it is a good opportunity to reconsider and relativize the civil wars of the 1990s. How have the trends of the African civil wars changed from the 1960s to the 2000s? How do the civil wars in the 1990s relate to civil wars of the other decades? Do the civil wars in the 1990s and the civil wars in the other period have the same causes? This article tackles these questions by elucidating the overlapping trends of the African

1) In this article, I refer to 'Africa' and 'sub-Saharan Africa' interchangeably. This article focuses on countries of Sub-Sahara Africa. North Africa is not in focus.

civil wars from the 1960s to the 2000s. In order to avoid overlooking minor trends, this article analyzes a quantitative dataset of armed conflict through qualitative manners. The dataset used in this article is from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, which has been popular among scholars of armed conflicts²⁾.

Note that this article only deals with civil wars in independent countries in Africa. Colonial wars are not discussed in this article.

The findings of this article are as follows. First, majority of the civil wars in the 1990s were newly broken. Among countries that experienced civil wars in the decade, more than half countries had not been involved in warfare before the decade (if they were, not intense), while the rest of the countries faced with continuations of armed conflicts from the 1960s. This tells that the 1990s are the decade in which more new armed conflicts broke out than other decades but, it does not mean that most of the wars are newly broken. Second, the civil wars in the 1990s have a precursor. Coups erupted in several countries in the 1980s. Most of the countries that experienced the coups were not involved in civil wars in the following decade. The probable reason is that the coups provided an opportunity for national reforms, while countries that experienced civil wars in the 1990s missed the chances. Third, the larger part of new civil wars in the 1990s broke out not only because of domestic factors, but also because of influence from neighboring countries. Several zones were observable, in which armed conflicts of respective countries affected each other.

Causes of the African civil wars in the 1990s

Discussion begins with examining the civil wars in the 1990s. During the 1990s, Africa experienced rampant rises of civil wars. Due to the impact, scholars have attempted to understand the mechanism of the eruptions. The causes and characteristics of the civil wars in the 1990s have been studied thoroughly. Such studies also provide hints to understand previous civil wars as well. Therefore, first, I show commonly shared view

2) The version 4-2009 is used in this article. For the detail, see the following address. <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/>.

among scholars on how civil wars in the 1990s broke out. For the purpose of simplification, I organize the causes into three factors; structural factor, long-term factor, and trigger factor.

The structural factor

A ruling system, which were typically seen in African states, is considered a structural factor of the civil wars in the 1990s (cf. Chabal and Daloz 1999; Reno 1995; Takeuchi 2007). At the time of independence, most of African states adopted multi-party systems, but this system could not regulate political violence. Political oppositions extended beyond legal frameworks. The dysfunction of the system became apparent in the late 1960s. Political violence and unconstitutional regime changes (typically coups) had been rampant. In order to maintain political order, the rulers abandoned the democratic systems and adopted authoritarian rules. As the result, the number of countries of either military rule or one-party system increased since the late 1960s (Takeuchi 2007).

In such autocratic rules, rulers developed non-institutionalized way to subjugate political actors in their hands. A ruler developed patronage politics of economic distribution. The state rulers maintained their power by controlling state resources in their private hand, and distribute to his subordinates. A president personally controlled the government's economic resources by diverting official revenue or by engaging in illicit economic activities using state apparatus³⁾. A ruler took control of the country's economic resources (Reno 2012).

In order to maintain the power, a ruler distributed material benefits to his subordinates. The subordinate politicians could enjoy economic benefits as long as they were submissive to the ruler. A ruler might appoint his subordinate politicians to governmental posts that were economically beneficial. For example, managers of airports and ports had opportunities to benefit through taxing and illicit trades. Positions of the procurement section provided chances to accept kickbacks. These politicians could build their per-

3) Reno (1995) illustrate how rulers accumulate their personal wealth in the case of Sierra Leone.

sonal, commercial, and political connections while keeping oneself under the subordination to their president. For a ruler, to control political elites is to make them satisfy to be under the control (Reno 2012: 12, 166).

However, this rule which is based on patronage and on resource distribution was fragile. In this ruling system, a person who captures a state can obtain state resources in their own hands. This person can manage the resources belong to a state according to his personal will. This personalization of state wealth works to intensify political struggles. Subordinates challenge to a ruler if they are not satisfied with being under their ruler's control. As a result, unconstitutional regime changes are more likely. Thus, ruling system prevalent in Africa works as a structural cause of civil war in the 1990s.

Long-term factor

The long-term factor is the decay of patronage rule by economic downturn. The ruling system had eroded because of economic deterioration. State rulers lost their resource for distribution as their countries were involved in economic crisis.

The oil crisis of the 1970s is the trigger of economic crisis. It fostered a recession in the industrialized countries of Europe and North America. The recession lowered demands and prices of agricultural and mineral products. The African economy, which depends on exports of primary commodities, had deteriorated as the consequence. The economic deterioration undermined the ability of African states to repay national debts. Rulers in African states sustained their rules by distributing economic benefits. Due to a double crisis involving exports and debt, the state rulers could no longer sustain resource distribution to his subordinates. Due to the lack of distributing resource, the ruler lose their power to grip their subordinates (Cooper 2002: 88-89; cf. Reno 1998).

The power of a state ruler was further reduced by economic reforms enforced by international financing institutions. African governments, trapped by debt default, sought help from international financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World

Bank) for additional loans or debt rescheduling. Those institutions imposed economic reforms in exchange for accepting economic reform which is called a 'structural adjustment program.' In a structural adjustment program, radical economic reforms—a shrinking government, removing economic regulation, a deregulating market etc.—were implemented. Radical economic reforms further deteriorated the economic situation in African states (Cooper 2002: 116).

One misfortune followed another. The end of the Cold War made the superpowers withdraw from providing strategic aids to African states. During the Cold War period, superpowers, both the West and the East, assisted African states in fostering the Cold War alliance. Since the Cold War ended, they lost interest in African states. The cut-off of aid further afflicted the rulers of African countries. Thus, ruler gradually lose resources for sustaining their patronage rule.

Trigger factor

Economic deterioration undermined a ruler's grip on the state. It gave the subordinates more chances to challenge the ruler.

In some countries, a former subordinate organized rebel groups. Excluding subordinates who have relatively strong power are possible challengers for a ruler. Rulers after remove such subordinates from a government. Common strategies for state rulers to exclude their opponents are to make a charge against them of a coup plot or of enable zzzlement. Those who were excluded from a central government challenge to a ruler by rebelling against the ruler.

In some countries, the electoral process caused civil wars. Prior to the 1990s, opposition parties had been outlawed under autocratic rule. By contrast, in the 1990s, competitive democracy bloomed. The international pressure as well as pressure from domestic movements make a goverment introduce multi-party system. Elections are a legal chance for political elites to take state resources into their own hands. Former subordinates of a ruler reemerge as party leaders in the process of democratization. They competed in election campaigns. However, the campaign escalated into a

conflict among groups of supporters. It further escalated to civil wars when the candidates provided supporters with arms (cf. Takeuchi 2007).

Thus, escalation of political struggle among political elites are widely considered as the cause of civil wars (Allen 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Reno 1998; Takeuchi 2007). Thus, the civil wars in the 1990s broke out due to an accumulation of several factors: political system based on patronage worked as structural factor. Economic deterioration since the 1970s, and subsequent structural adjustment programs caused reduction of resources in patronage systems. The end of the Cold War also reduce the amount of resources for rulers to distribute. Democratization, or the introduction of a multi-party electoral system works for igniting political competitions and developing into civil wars.

This pathway explains generalized path of African countries to fall into civil wars. Countries who fell into civil wars took more or less similar pass. On the other hand, countries who did not fell into civil wars could escape from taking the path. Bearing the path into mind, this paper examine the trends from 1960 to 2009.

THE PRIO/UCDP DATASET AND THE OBSERVED TRENDS OF THE CIVIL WARS

Selection of a dataset

Most studies on African civil wars concentrate on the 1990s, but some argue the trends have occurred since the 1960s (Clapham 1998; Reno 2011). However, previous analyses only show the major trends. They do not discuss minor trends/even though minor trends might be an important factor in capturing the dynamics in Africa. In order to avoid overlooking minor trends, this article select cases from a dataset of armed conflict. As quantitative dataset is based on a clearly-measurable definition of 'armed conflict,' minor conflicts and hidden trends cannot be missed.

Several datasets are available for armed conflict. To name a few, the dataset of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), Monty Marshall's 2006 study for the UK government, and the PRIO/UCDP armed conflict dataset

are popular (cf. William 2011: 16-23).

I use the PRIO/UCDP dataset because of its reliability and popularity. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) is a leading institution of peace research established in 1959, which owns several leading journals on peace studies. The PRIO/UCDP dataset was produced in collaboration with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This dataset was originally published in 2002. New versions are published every year with improvements and refinements. I use the version 4-2009, which covers the period from 1946 to 2009.

The reason I use the PRIO/UCDP dataset is not only because of its reliability and popularity, but also because of its lower definition of 'armed conflict.' The definition of 'armed conflict' in this dataset is lower than any other datasets. Due to the lower threshold, capturing minor trends is also expected.

Definition of 'armed conflict' and the data selection

This dataset defines 'armed conflict' as a battle-related death of a given year. In the PRIO/UCDP dataset, armed conflict is defined as,

a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

Readers might criticize the definition because battle-related death seems to be an inappropriate barometer for civil wars because civilians are also involved. Many indirect deaths occur as well. However, battle-related death is at least numerable. Civilian deaths or indirect deaths in civil wars are difficult to enumerate. Therefore, in most cases, the dataset relies on battle-related deaths in one way or another. The UCDP/PRIO dataset is one of those cases.

The PRIO/UCDP dataset categorizes armed conflicts into four categories; namely 'internal armed conflicts,' 'internationalized internal armed con-

flict,' 'interstate armed conflicts'⁴⁾ and 'extrasystemic conflicts'⁵⁾. The analysis in this article focus on 'internal conflict' and 'internationalized internal armed conflict'. Internal armed conflict is defined as an armed conflict which "occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.", and internationalized internal armed conflict is defined as an armed conflict which "occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides." (UCDP/PRIO 2009). I call the two types of armed conflicts 'civil wars' hereafter. I pick up "civil wars" observed in sub-Saharan Africa from the dataset which covers whole of the world.

How to deal with the definition


The quantitative definition needs careful attention. First, it might include violence, which is normally not considered armed conflict. For example, an escalated coup that develops into exchange of fire, or skirmishes between governmental forces and unknown armed groups also fits the definition. At the same time, it might not include violence, which is generally considered an armed conflict. The Rwandan Genocide is not included in the dataset, because it is not "contested incompatibility...between two parties" (UCDP/PRIO 2009).

Second, whether a given year is in armed conflict or not is defined by the number of deaths. The year with less than 25 battle-related deaths is not counted as the period of armed conflict. Even in the period that a country's territory was divided by several armed factions, any year that saw less than 25 battle-related deaths is not a period of armed conflict. For example, the first Liberian civil war historically began in 1989 and ended in 1996; but, in the UCDP/PRIO database, only 1989 and 1990 are included in the periods of armed conflict. Liberia was divided by several armed factions by 1996, but in the period of 1991 to 1996, the battle-related deaths do not exceed 25. As a result, this period is not counted as a period of armed conflict. Thus, the period of armed conflicts is often different from

4) Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.

5) Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. Majority of extrasystemic armed conflicts are colonial conflicts.

Figure 1: Number of countries with civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa (1960 to 2009)



Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2009


what is recognized in case studies.

Overall trend of African ‘civil wars’

Keeping in mind the argument so far, I show data from the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Figure 1 shows the number of countries involved in civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. The number of civil wars increased since 1985. This increase would support the previous studies which point out the escalation of armed conflict in the 1990s (Allen 1999; Takeuchi 2007).

This graph shows civil wars with more than 25 battle-related deaths. In order to look at the trend of civil wars in higher intensity, Figure 2 shows the number of civil wars that have more than 1000 battle-related deaths.

Figure 2: Number of countries with civil wars with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa (1960 to 2009)



Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2009

Judging from battle-related deaths, civil wars with higher intensity concentrated from the late 1970s to the 1980s. It is prone to decrease during the 1990s. It shows that number of civil wars increased in the 1990s, but they were not necessarily more intense than previous wars.

Qualitative analysis of the UCDP/PRIO dataset

Then, what trends are hidden behind the overall trend of the African civil wars? In order to uncover trends of the African civil wars hidden within the overall trends, this section analyzes the cases of civil wars in the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

I analyze trends with country-basis. I examine trajectories of every civil war (cases in the categories of 'internal armed conflict' and 'internationalized internal conflict'), then, sort countries out based on the characteristics

of civil wars. Some countries fit into more than two categories. In these cases, I pair the country with the category that best fits the country.

Five trends of the civil wars

The categorization of the civil wars in Africa from 1960 to 2009 is shown in Figure 3. The graphs in Figure 3 show the experience of civil wars in each African country. I categorized the countries into five trends. Two countries (Nigeria and Angola) are left as exceptions. I cannot categorize the two countries into any trends. The points (●) show the year of independence.

(Category. 1) Countries of chronic civil wars

Category 1 represents ‘countries of chronic civil wars.’ The countries in this category, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad, have been involved in civil wars consistently since the 1960s. These countries could not establish the rule of the central government since their independences up to the present day. In these countries, civil wars are still remained in the late 2000s⁶⁾.

(Category. 2) Countries of the Cold-War induced civil wars

Category 2 represents ‘countries of Cold-War induced civil wars.’ Mozambique and South Africa fit into that category. In these countries, civil wars were fueled by the Cold War structure. The civil wars are sustained because of military assistance from both the East and the West. In these countries, civil wars ended along with the end of the Cold War.

(Category. 3) Coups in the 1980s

Category 3 represents ‘coups in the 1980s.’ Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, and Togo are in that category. These ‘civil wars’ are not civil wars in the traditional sense; they are coups. These coups are regarded as ‘internal conflicts’ in the definition of the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Most of these civil wars are short in duration.

6) Independence of South Sudan is in 2011, which is not in the realm of analysis in this article.

(Category. 4) Civil wars in chain reactions


Thirteen countries make up category 4. In these countries, civil wars broke out in sequence due to the influence from neighboring countries. 'Chain reactions' of civil wars have been observed in these countries. This trend began in the 1970s, but accelerated in the 1990s. I name this category 'Civil wars in chain reactions.' The thirteen countries that are a part of this category are Burundi, Central Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda.

(Category. 5) Stand-alone civil wars


The last category, category 5 is 'stand-alone civil wars.' The countries in this group experience civil wars in the 1990s. Different from category 4, the civil wars in these countries did not have strong relation with neighboring countries. In these countries, internal causes are stronger than neighboring factors. However, these countries are not completely free from influence of neighboring countries. Some influence might be there. At least, in these countries, influence from neighbors is not direct cause of the civil wars. These countries do not trigger neighboring civil wars either. Comoro is an island country, while the others (Guinea Bissau, Congo [Brazzaville], Djibouti, Lesotho and Senegal) are located in the African continent.

Figure 3: Five trends of the civil wars


(Category. 1) Countries of Chronic Civil Wars






(Category. 2) Countries of the Cold-War Induced Civil Wars



(Category. 3) Coups in the 1980s



(Figure 3 continues...)


(Category. 4) Civil Wars in Chain Reactions.**(Category. 5) Stand-Alone Civil Wars****(Exceptions)****(EXCEPTIONS)**

I cannot categorize Angola and Nigeria. Angola is mix of category 2 (group of Cold- War induced civil wars) and category 5 (stand-alone civil wars). The civil war in Angola, which is the continuation of colonial war, lasts because of the Cold War structure. Neighboring countries and the superpowers provide military assistance to the warring actors. After the end of the Cold War, an Angolan rebel group (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola: UNITA) sustained themselves by profiting from mining diamonds in their territory. Military aid stopped when the Cold War ended, but the UNITA survived by funding themselves. Nigeria does not fit into any of the categories.

Relations among the five trends

These five trends are observed in Africa since the 1960s. Then, how are these five trends interrelated? Figure 6 shows the trends of civil wars in a glance.

Most of the African countries have achieved independence in 1960. In the

Figure 4: The five trends of the civil wars

early and mid-1960s, several civil wars broke out. These civil wars erupted because the newly established governments could not control domestic actors. Some countries experienced short-term civil wars (these wars are shown in the encircled part of Figure 6) (Cameroon, Congo, DRC and Nigeria). Majortly of countries settled the wars. On the other hand, some countries have not been able to control their own territory until present. By these countries (Chad, Ethiopia and Sudan), Category 1 is consisted.

Regardless of initial reasons, several countries were kept involved in civil wars because of the Cold War structure. These countries consisted Category 2. In South Africa, oppositions against the white minority rule developed into a civil war. South Africa was one of strong allies of the West, which attempted to avoid communization of the neighboring countries. The white minority rule was condoned in the logic of the Cold War.

Countries of Lusophone Africa achieved independences came in 1975 after the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon. The Angolan independent war turned into a civil war due to the independence in 1975. Several anti-colonial factions struggled for the central government at the time of the independence. Mozambique once achieved independence but soon fell into a civil

war which prolonged by military assistances to warring factions by the East and by the West (Category 2 and Angola). These civil wars were resolved at the time that the Cold War ended.

Economic deterioration since the late 1970s undermined the control of the rules of states. That led to civil wars through two manners. Categories of 3 to 5 are in one or the other.

First manner is that weakened territorial control allowed anti-governmental groups to rebel. These groups were supported by neighboring countries or used the neighboring countries as rear bases. Uganda, which shares border with Sudan, fell into a civil war in the late 1970s. Then, in the early 1980s, a civil war broke out in Somalia also. Neighboring Ethiopia had related to the civil war. These countries have been in the state of civil wars until the present. These countries ignited further chain reactions in the 1990s (Category 4).

The other manner become evident around 1980s (Category 3). The economic crisis since the late 1970s ignited coups in some countries. Starting from Liberia, several countries experienced coups. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya and Togo are examples. Except for Liberia, these countries had not experienced civil wars afterwards. It might be because the coups worked as chances to reform the countries (Liberia is categorized in Category 4 because of subsequent civil wars).

Since around 1990s, civil wars became rampant. Previous studies shows that economic deteriorations since the 1970s are long-term factor of these civil wars. Some civil wars in the 1990s lasted longer (Category 4), while the others (Category 5) are shorter.

The difference was made by influence from neighbors. In the countries of Category 5, fewer influence from neighboring countries on outbreaks of the civil wars. The civil wars in category 5 were not influenced by neighbors. On the other hand, in the countries of category 4, neighboring influence are strong. Countries in Category 4 imported civil wars from adjacent countries that had been already in civil wars. Once a civil war was imported, the country exported civil wars to the other neighbors. Such chain re-

actions began in countries of Category 1, spread to Uganda and Somalia in the 1970s and the 1980s, then, spread further to the other countries during the 1990s.

The comparison between Category 4 and 5 shows that civil wars with cross-border influence (Category 4) tend to prolong more than separately induced civil wars (Category 5). According to Figure 4, only civil wars in Category 1 and Category 4 (Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda, Central Africa and Mali) are left in 2009. Civil wars in the other categories (Category 2, 3, and 5) had winded down.

CIVIL WARS IN THE 1990s: ZONE OF CHAIN REACTIONS

Civil wars in the 1990s are either prolonged civil wars (Category 1) or newly erupted civil wars (Category 4 except for Uganda and Somalia and Category 5). As Category 4 except for Somalia and Uganda, and Category 5 shows, new civil wars in the 1990s broke out in countries which rarely experienced civil wars previously. It was visually shown by the empty space in Figure 5 that lies the period from the 1960s to the 1980s of Category 4 and 5, which is encircled by dotted lines (·····)(Somalia and Uganda are exceptions).

The number of countries in Category 4 is more than in Category 5. That means that civil wars were more likely to break out with influence from neighbors. Civil wars of both categories have domestic causes, but countries in Category 4 were intensified by neighbors, while ones in Category 5 were not (if any, few).

‘Chain reactions’ can be observed in Category 4 in which a civil war in a country affected to eruptions at another civil war in neighboring countries. In majority of case, the chain reactions began from countries of Category 1. Figure 7 shows geographical mapping of the chain reactions. The chain reactions were concentrated into four zones. I call them, ‘Zones of Chain Reaction.’

In three among four zones, the chain reactions started from countries of Category 1. Countries of Category 1 have experienced civil wars chronical-

Figure 5: Geographical mapping of zones in the chain reaction of civil wars



ly. These wars fostered civil wars of neighboring countries, when these countries lose their grip to their territories.

The first zone is Horn of Africa. This zone was formed since the 1980s. The countries in this zone are Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. The mutual influence among these countries made civil wars prolong (cf. Reno, 2012: 123). Sudan and Ethiopia are in Category 1.

The second zone is Great Lakes Region, which includes Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. In this zone, the chain reaction started from Sudan.

Then, it spread to Uganda in the late 1970s. Then, Uganda exported a civil war to Rwanda by assisting the Rwandan rebel, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Rwandan instability introduced by the RPF triggered the Rwandan Genocide, as well as civil wars in neighboring Burundi and DRC. Then, Eastern region of DRC emerged as a hub of chain reactions which 'import' and 'export' civil wars from/to neighboring countries since the late 1990s. The areas around Eastern region of the DRC have been unstable up to now.

The third zone is the Chad Basin in which Sudan, Chad, Niger, Central Africa, and Mali are located. This zone does not have a hub. This zone is a sequence of several dyadic relations: one country affects another country. This zone has been active since the early 2000s. Chad (a country of Category 1) experienced chronic civil wars since the independence. In the 2000s, Darfur war began. Since then, this zone has become more destabilized.

The fourth zone is the Gulf of Guinea. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d' Ivoire are included. This zone is not related to Category 1. The destabilization of this zone started from Liberia. Liberia experienced a coup in 1980, but is different from other countries which experienced coups in the 1980s (Category 3). Countries of Category 3 had not experienced civil wars in the 1990s. On the other hand, Liberia was involved in civil war again in the 1990s. This is because the military regime of Samuel Doe, which established by the coup in 1980, could not stabilize Liberia. Doe regime further destabilized the country and that led to a new civil war. The head of a rebel leader, Charles Taylor, who ignited the first Liberian civil war, was a former cabinet member of the military regime. Thus, countries of Category 4 are geographically concentrated in four zones.

CONCLUSION

This article attempts to capture the longer trends of the African civil wars from the 1960s to 2009. This article categorizes the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2009 into five trends, and discusses each trend and how they relate each other. In conclusion, I can point out four findings.

First, the increase of civil wars in the 1990s was more acute than ever thought. This article finds that the majority of civil wars in the decade are new ones (Category 4 and 5), while some of wars are existing since the 1960s (Category 1). The new wars broke out in countries that have experienced few civil wars before. However, the acute increase in the 1990s was obscured on the Figure 1 because other civil wars ended in the 1980s. Countries in Category 2 experienced the Cold War induced civil wars which had ended before 1990. This means that the civil wars were replaced around 1990 which is clearly observed in the Figure 4. Therefore, I can conclude that a lot of new civil wars broke out in the 1990s.

Second, a prior phenomenon of the civil wars in the 1990s was observed in the 1980s. In the 1980s, several countries experienced coups (Category 3 and Liberia). These coups broke out because of economic deterioration since the late 1970s. However, most of these countries succeeded to stabilize countries (Liberia is exception). The countries in which coups broke out in the 1980s had chances of economic and political reforms before the situation worsened further. On the other hand, countries that had not experienced coups fell into civil wars in the 1990s.

Third, the majority of the new civil wars in the 1990s broke out as a result of cross-border expansions from neighboring countries. The expansions originated from the countries which chronically experience civil wars (Category 1). The cross-border expansions started from the countries and spread to other countries.

At last, I point out problems of this article. First, the analysis in this article is on the basis of country. Some country experienced more than two civil wars in a same period. For example, Ethiopia and Sudan experienced several conflicts in a given period. This article does not analyze these domestic dynamics. Second, this article does not analyze new trend of violence in the 2000s. Since the late 2000s, in Kenya and Sudan, inter-communal conflicts have broken out. Such conflicts are not included in UCDP/PRIO database, because they are not in the definition of armed conflict. While governments should be involved in armed conflict in the definition, governments are not involved in the inter-communal conflicts. These conflicts are not armed conflicts by the UCDP/PRIO's definition. Such new

conflicts should be analyzed using a different methodology.

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